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0Abstract
It is widely recognised that the "one-size-￿ts-all" monetary policy of the euro-zone is a potential
problem. How much of a problem has not been much investigated. It is argued in this paper that it may
result in the euro not being sustainable in the longer term without drastic changes to other aspects of
the EU and, in particular, to ￿scal policy. The problem is not the fault of the ECB, but is due to having
a single nominal interest rate. As a result, the evidence reveals that national price levels are diverging
over time which is leading to a permanent and unsustainable loss of competitiveness. A formal theory
of in￿ ation in the euro-zone based on an open-economy version of the New Keynesian model is used to
analyse the problem. Although the euro system has automatic stabilising mechanisms arising from the
changes in competitiveness and from absorbtion e⁄ects, these are shown to be not strong enough. The
model is then modi￿ed to allow for ￿scal transfers between countries and the size of the transfers required
to produce a euro that may be sustainable are derived. It is shown that, in e⁄ect, this is an in￿ ation tax,
requiring high in￿ ation countries to make transfers to low in￿ ation countries as often happens within a
single country in the form of unemployed bene￿ts to low activity regions. Ultimately, the choice may lie
between closer political union and a break-up of the euro-zone.
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11 Introduction
To judge by the success of the European Central Bank (ECB) in attaining its in￿ ation objectives,
the euro appears to be a sustainable monetary system. The ECB￿ s self-imposed target range
for HICP in￿ ation is 0 ￿ 2% per annum, with the emphasis on 2%. Over the period 2000-2006,
in￿ ation has ￿ uctuated between only 1:6 ￿ 2:5%. This is a considerable achievement, and much
to the credit of the ECB. What possible reason could there be, therefore, for questioning the
sustainability of the euro?
Wyplosz (2006), reviewing the arguments surrounding the launch of the euro in 1999, observed
that the founders largely ignored academic views that the EU was not an optimal currency area and
that there are still tensions concerning the Stability and Growth Pact. Nonetheless, his conclusion
is that academic opinion now generally recognises that the euro has been a major success, partly
due to the pragmatism shown in implementing policy. Wolf (2006), one of his discussants, said
that, ￿to put it mildly￿ , he was not convinced that the euro has been a ￿￿ major success￿ , unless
one means by a success that it exists￿ . In his view the main problem has been the ￿less than
stellar￿performance of the euro-zone economy since 2000 which he notes averaged 1:3% between
2001-2005, according to the IMF.
In this paper the focus is di⁄erent from that of Wyplosz and is concerned more with the issue
raised by Wolf. The problems stem from having a ￿one-size-￿ts-all￿monetary policy. This may
cause fundamental problems for individual country in￿ ation rates and economic activity which
could lead to the demise of the euro. Moreover, the ECB is powerless to do anything about this
as the problem lies in the system and not in the way that the ECB conducts monetary policy.
The argument is simple. The ECB sets a single nominal interest rate for all euro-zone countries.
For high in￿ ation countries this implies a low - even a negative - domestic real interest rate, and
for low in￿ ation countries it implies a higher - and positive - domestic real interest rate. The lower
is the domestic real interest rate (the single common nominal rate minus domestic in￿ ation), the
2greater is the stimulus to domestic economic activity, and hence to domestic in￿ ation. Thus,
while aggregate in￿ ation in the euro-zone may be on target, the in￿ ation rates across individual
countries seem unlikely to converge, and may even diverge. In either case, high in￿ ation countries
would steadily lose their competitiveness and low in￿ ation countries would gain competitiveness.
If the divergence in in￿ ation rates and competitiveness were unchecked, the euro system would
eventually become unsustainable.
For the euro to be sustainable, o⁄setting factors must exist and must be strong enough to
prevent such divergence. The aim of this paper is to consider whether there are such factors,
whether they are automatic, or need to be implemented using discretionary policy, and whether
such factors would be likely to prove strong enough in practice.
There are two obvious potential automatic stabilisers for national euro-zone in￿ ation rates.
Both arise from intra-euro-zone trade. One is a price e⁄ect: competitiveness; the other is an
income e⁄ect: absorbtion. Persistently high in￿ ation causes a national price level to diverge from
the average, and hence results in a loss of competitiveness. As this would reduce domestic demand
and output, it may be expected to put downward pressure on domestic in￿ ation thereby acting
to o⁄set the higher in￿ ation and correct the loss of competitiveness. A euro-zone country with
strong domestic economic activity (caused by low real interest rates which generate high in￿ ation)
may be expected to import from countries with weaker economic activity (due to having high
real interest rates). This would raise economic activity and hence in￿ ationary pressures in the
exporting countries, thereby acting as another corrective.
If these two automatic stabilisers are not strong enough then the internal stability of the
euro-zone must either rely on exogenous trade e⁄ects, or on internal euro-zone income transfers
from high to low activity countries. These could be exogenously determined by, for example,
remittances, or more realistically, they could be the result of ￿scal policy.
In the absence of such correctives, the sustainability of the euro-zone may depend on a radical
change of EU ￿scal policy. This, in turn, would almost certainly require an increase in central
3political control in the EU, and hence a loss of national political independence. Having a single
European currency may not therefore be simply an economic decision; it may have profound
implications for the political structures of Europe.
The signi￿cance of the link between a single currency and EU ￿scal policy was appreciated
prior to the introduction of the euro. Major concerns were expressed by the EC Commission
about whether the accompanying ￿scal framework was adequate. This was a central reason for
establishing the Stability and Growth Pact, the principal aims of which are to lessen political
pressures within the EU to monetise debt, and to avoid government defaults on euro-denominated
debt which might raise the risk premium for all EU countries. The Pact is therefore concerned
with individual country ￿scal policy, whereas what may be required to make the euro sustainable is
inter-country ￿scal policy. Early discussions of EU ￿scal policy were contained in the EC￿ s report
￿ Stable-money - sound ￿nances￿(1993), particularly Section V on ￿ The Economics of Community
Public Finance￿ . One the main conclusions was the need to set up a full stabilisation mechanism
such as that in the US. Goodhart (2007a), one of the contributors to the EC report, argues that
it is an opportune time to resurrect this report. He suggests that an EU stabilisation scheme
could be funded by shifting seignorage receipts from the euro to a central euro area budget. In
Goodhart (2007b) he argues for cross-regional transfers within the EU in order to improve the
optimal currency area characteristics of the EU.
The paper is set out as follows. First, we consider the evidence on EU country price levels to
see whether there really is such a problem. We ￿nd that although in￿ ation rates have not diverged
markedly since the inception of the euro in 1999, national price levels, and hence competitiveness,
have diverged - for some countries markedly. Moreover, economic growth has been far greater in
high in￿ ation than low in￿ ation countries. We then present a formal model of in￿ ation in the
euro-zone derived from a standard single-country New Keynesian in￿ ation model. This model
is modi￿ed to include open-economy e⁄ects such as the real exchange rate and foreign income.
The national models are then combined to form a simple multi-country model of the euro-zone.
4This model is able to capture the e⁄ects of competitiveness and absorbtion. The implications of
a single currency and an optimal common monetary policy for euro-zone and national in￿ ation
rates and price levels are analysed. It is shown that, despite the presence of the two automatic
stabilisers, there is still a built-in tendency for national price levels to diverge. The model is then
amended to include ￿scal transfers. In e⁄ect, these amount to an in￿ ation tax. It is found that
such transfers can in principle prevent national price levels from diverging, and a formula is derived
for determining the size of the transfers that are needed to achieve this. This is what commonly
occurs within a single country, and takes the form of unemployed bene￿ts to low activity regions.
In the concluding section, the political consequences of introducing such transfers are considered.
It is argued that, ultimately, the choice may lie between closer political union and a break-up of
the euro-zone.
2 EU prices 1999-2006
We wish to see whether or not price levels in the euro-zone have diverged since 1999 when the
euro began. We begin by considering EU in￿ ation rates for the original 12 countries. All data
are from the OECD. Figure 1 plots the year-on-year in￿ ation rates for each country together with
EU in￿ ation (in bold type) for the period 1990-2006. The corresponding UK in￿ ation rate is the
dotted line. EU in￿ ation was on a falling trend prior to the launch of the euro in 1999; afterwards
the EU in￿ ation rate has ￿ uctuated close to 2%. Convergence of individual country in￿ ation rates
seemed to occur until around 1993, but after that in￿ ation has shown no tendency for any further
convergence; in fact, since 2005, in￿ ation rates appear to have diverged.


























































































































































































































































This is con￿rmed in Figure 2 which plots the standard deviation of year-on-year in￿ ation rates
across EU countries for the period 1998-2006. In￿ ation convergence continued until 2005; since
then in￿ ation rates have diverged a little.













































6Figure 3 plots the natural logarithms of the price levels of these EU countries from the start
of 1999, the base for each series. Since the natural logarithm of the price level for each country
is zero in the ￿rst quarter of 1999, the data depict cumulative in￿ ation rates since 1999. Again
the average EU price level is in bold type and the UK is the dotted line. We are interested in
the slopes of the lines which measure the average in￿ ation rates over the period 1999-2006. (The
increase in the dispersion of the lines is partly an artefact of the choice of base period. Had the
base period been the last period of 2006, the lines would be shown converging at the end and not
the start, but the slopes of the lines would still convey the information about average in￿ ation.)
The top line is Ireland, which has had the most in￿ ation, and the bottom line is Germany, which
has had the least in￿ ation. Thus price levels have steadily diverged implying a relative gain in
competitiveness for countries below the EU line and a loss in competitiveness for countries above
the EU. In order of the size of the gain in competitiveness we have Germany, France and then
Belgium.





































































































































































































































7According to our hypothesis, in the absence of stabilisers, countries with higher initial in￿ ation
rates are predicted to have higher average annual in￿ ation rates over the whole period due to price
level divergence. This is exactly what we ￿nd in Figure 4, where we plot the average annual rate
of in￿ ation against the initial rate of in￿ ation. A 450 line through the origin would indicate the
same average in￿ ation rate over the whole period as in 1999. As the data lie roughly parallel to
this, but slightly above, this indicates a higher average rate over the whole period than initially.




































A comparison of the growth of GDP over the same period is shown in Figure 5 which plots the
natural logarithm of GDP. Again, the EU is in bold type and the UK is the dotted line. Like the
price levels in Figure 3, the top line is Ireland and the bottom line is Germany, suggesting that
higher in￿ ation is associated with greater economic activity.








































































































































































































































To examine this further, in Figure 6 we plot the log of the price levels against the log of GDP
for each country. The individual country data are reported in Table 1. Figure 6 shows a strong
positive relation between in￿ ation and economic activity.




















9Bel Den Fr Ger Ir It Lux Nl Port Sp UK EU
Price 14:3 18:6 13:6 4:8 31:0 18:8 22:8 19:9 23:1 29:3 18:0 14:7
GDP 16:0 14:9 14:9 10:6 43:8 10:0 32:6 14:6 9:4 27:7 20:2 15:2
Table 1: Percentage Growth of Price and Output 1999-2006
This evidence o⁄ers considerable support for our hypothesis of divergence and suggests that the
automatic stabilisers are, at best, weak. At one extreme we have Germany whose price level has
risen only 5% since 1999; at the other extreme we have Ireland and Spain whose price levels have
risen by 31% and 29% respectively, implying that they have lost about 25% in competitiveness,
or about 3:5% per annum. Moreover, countries with high in￿ ation rates also have high rates of
economic growth: Ireland￿ s GDP has grown by 44% and Spain￿ s by 28%, while Germany￿ s has
grown by only 11%. If there are automatic stabilising e⁄ects at work - and the di⁄erences in price
levels of Ireland and Germany suggest a substantial cumulative loss of competitiveness by Ireland
- then this evidence appears to suggest that so far they have not been strong enough to o⁄set the
e⁄ect on growth of real interest rates.
We note that the UK, which is not a member of the euro-zone, has an in￿ ation and growth
performance similar that of the EU average over this period. Both EU in￿ ation and growth have
been 15% while the corresponding UK rates are 18% for in￿ ation and 20% for growth. It appears,
therefore, that by having an independent monetary policy the UK has maintained competitiveness
with the EU in the aggregate.
3 Optimal monetary policy in the euro-zone
We have seen that in practice competitiveness and absorbtion e⁄ects do not appear to have
o⁄set the consequences of having mis-aligned individual country real interest rates. We now
examine these issues more formally by constructing a model of the euro-zone with a common
10monetary policy and with real interest rate, competitiveness and absorbtion e⁄ects. We then
derive the optimal discretionary monetary policy for the euro-zone subject to this model. We
wish to determine whether in theory competitiveness and absorbtion e⁄ects provide the required
automatic stabilisers.
The model for the euro-zone is based on a stylised open-economy version of the New Keynesian
model. It is su¢ cient to assume that the euro-zone consists of only two countries. We assume
that each economy is described by two equations: open economy aggregate demand and supply
functions. These are
AD : xit = ￿￿(Rt ￿ Et￿i;t+1) + ￿(pjt ￿ pit) + ￿(st + p￿
t ￿ pit) + ￿xjt + zit + exi;t (1)
AS : ￿i;t+1 = Et￿it + ￿(xit ￿ xn;it) + e￿i;t+1 (2)
for i;j = 1;2, where 0 < ￿;￿ < 1, xit is the output of country i at time t, xn;it is its long-run
equilibrium (or natural) level of output which is assumed to be exogenous, pit is the price level
of country i, pjt ￿ pit is the terms of trade for country i in trade with country j, st + p￿
t ￿ pit
is the terms of trade for country i in trade with the rest of the world, st is the exchange rate
which is taken as given, p￿
t is the rest of the world price level and zit is an exogenous variable
a⁄ecting country i which will be de￿ned more precisely later. e￿it and exit are independent
serially independent shocks that are unknown to the central bank and are not part of the time t
information set, hence Ete￿;it = Etex;it = 0. Thus aggregate demand depends on the real interest
rate, the price di⁄erential (competitiveness) and foreign demand (absorbtion e⁄ects). Output
di⁄ers between the two countries due to di⁄erent in￿ ation expectations, price levels, real rates
of return, export demand and country-speci￿c shocks. In￿ ation di⁄ers due to di⁄erent in￿ ation
expectations, output gaps and country-speci￿c in￿ ation shocks. We note that taking expectations
of equation (2) gives Etxit = xni;t. Thus output is expected to be at its natural rate.
We adopt a standard formulation of optimal discretionary monetary policy under in￿ ation
targeting - see for example Barro and Gordon (1983), Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003). We
11assume that the central bank - which we refer to as the ECB - chooses the common interest rate




￿Et(xt ￿ xnt ￿ k)2 +
1
2
Et(￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿)2 (3)
where the average EU value is denoted by
at = ￿a1t + (1 ￿ ￿)a2t
￿ is the relative size of the economies. Thus the aim is to choose the common nominal interest
rate Rt to minimise the deviations of in￿ ation from the target level ￿￿ and output from the level
xnt + k, k ￿ 0. If the ECB were a strict in￿ ation targeter then ￿ = 0.
First we derive the optimal common nominal interest rate for this model and the implications
for expected EU in￿ ation and output. We then derive the in￿ ation and price level di⁄erentials
between euro-zone countries and examine whether the model implies that either or both diverge.
By specialising the model through removing the two potential automatic stabilisers in the aggre-
gated demand function - namely the e⁄ects of competitiveness and absorbtion - we examine what
happens to in￿ ation and price level divergence in the absence of these two e⁄ects.
For convenience, we assume that the two economies are of equal size, hence ￿ = 1
2. Average
























￿t+1 = Et￿t+1 + ￿(xt ￿ xnt) + e￿;t+1 (5)













Et￿t+1 = Et￿t+1 + ￿(Etxt ￿ xnt) (7)
Hence Etxt = xnt.







(Etxt ￿ xnt ￿ k) ￿
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
Et(￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿) = 0
This implies that the optimal rate of in￿ ation for the euro-zone is
Et￿t+1 = ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿





Consequently, we obtain the familiar result in optimal in￿ ation targeting that there is an aggregate
in￿ ation bias if both ￿ and k are positive, i.e. if the ECB is a ￿ exible in￿ ation targeter and seeks
to achieve a higher level of euro-zone output than the natural level. We note that none of the
additional variables in the aggregate demand function has a⁄ected this result.
In order to achieve the optimal level of in￿ ation, from equation (6), the ECB must set the
common nominal interest rate equal to














Hence, monetary policy responds negatively to higher aggregate output and to a loss of euro-zone
competitiveness with the rest of the world, and positively to exogenous e⁄ects such as an increase
in euro-zone exports to the rest of the world.
We now consider the implications for the two countries of this choice of nominal interest
rate. Substituting the nominal interest rate given by equation (9) into equation (??) and taking





13Recalling that Etxit = xni;t and subtracting from equation (10) the corresponding equation for
country j gives the following equation for the expected country in￿ ation di⁄erential
Et(￿i;t+1 ￿ ￿j;t+1) =
￿ + 2￿
￿
Et(pit ￿ pjt) +
1 + ￿
￿
(xni;t ￿ xnj;t) ￿
1
￿
(zit ￿ zjt) (11)
This is our key equation. It identi￿es the factors that cause the country in￿ ation di⁄erential.
Consider ￿rst the special case argued at the start of the paper where there are no competitive-
ness or absorbtion e⁄ects so that ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 0. In this case, the price level and natural output
terms vanish and the in￿ ation di⁄erential depends only exogenous individual country e⁄ects. If
these are di⁄erent (and remain constant) then the in￿ ation di⁄erential will persist. The price
levels would then diverge over time without bound. This is consistent with our earlier intuition.
Now assume that there are competitiveness and absorbtion e⁄ects so that ￿;￿;￿ > 0. Equation
(11) shows that the in￿ ation di⁄erential may still persist. A higher initial price level, a higher
natural rate of output and a smaller response to world trade all cause in￿ ation in country i
to exceed and that in country j. Moreover, the di⁄erence is greater, the stronger are the two
competitiveness coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿, and the absorbtion coe¢ cient ￿, and the smaller the response
to the real interest rate ￿. Thus if country i starts with a higher price level than country j then
the stronger is competitiveness, the larger is the resulting in￿ ation di⁄erential. This indicates that
the competitiveness gap is expected to increase over time.
This can be shown more formally by noting that Et￿i;t+1 = Etpi;t+1 ￿ pit. Hence equation
(11) can be re-written as
Et(pit￿pjt) =
￿
￿ + ￿ + 2￿
Et(pi;t+1￿pj;t+1)￿
1 + ￿
￿ + ￿ + 2￿
(xni;t￿xnj;t)+
1
￿ + ￿ + 2￿
(zit￿zjt) (12)
which is an unstable di⁄erence equation. Thus, any initial price di⁄erential will grow without
bound unless corrected by a reversal in sign, at some point in the future, of the country di⁄er-
entials in the natural output levels or the world trade e⁄ects. Consequently, the presence of the
competitiveness e⁄ect does not prevent the price levels from diverging. And since the other two
14variables are assumed to be exogenous, they are unable to alter this - except if, by chance, they
o⁄set each other.
We note that if the natural output levels are endogenous and increase due to capital accumu-
lation caused by low real interest rates, then higher in￿ ation countries would have higher natural
rates of output. From equation (11) this would raise the country in￿ ation di⁄erential.
Despite these problems at the individual country level, euro-zone in￿ ation is una⁄ected. As
its remit is euro-zone in￿ ation, and not in￿ ation in individual euro-zone countries, there would
be no incentive for the ECB to react to the problem by changing interest rates. In fact, the ECB
is powerless to do anything about widening country price level di⁄erentials. Thus, although the
euro-system would be achieving its in￿ ation objectives, it would be inherently unstable, and hence
unsustainable, due to the widening in￿ ation and price di⁄erential between countries.
One way to avoid this is for each country to set its own monetary policy. This would require
the country with the higher in￿ ation rate to set its nominal interest rate higher than does the
ECB, and the country with the lower in￿ ation rate to set its nominal interest rate lower than
does the ECB. Is there, however, a possible solution that does not involve the break-up of the
euro-zone? We consider this next.
3.1 Fiscal transfers
It is sometimes argued that the problems arising from a ￿one-size-￿ts-all￿monetary policy for the
EU are little di⁄erent from those faced by any country with regional di⁄erences as they too share
a common currency. Does this mean that there is a similar danger of regional divergence? One
of the main di⁄erences between the regions of a single country and the constituent countries of
a monetary union is ￿scal policy. In a single country there are usually automatic ￿scal transfers
between regions. This happens through national tax revenues being redistributed nationally; the
successful regions contribute relatively more tax revenues and the less successful regions receive
15relatively more transfers. The EU does not have such a system of ￿scal transfers between countries.
We now consider the implications of including ￿scal transfers in the above model.
A ￿scal transfer of gi from country i to country j would, in e⁄ect, reduce the resources avail-
able for private-sector consumption in country i and increase those in country j, whilst leaving
equilibrium output in both countries unchanged. As a result we re-specify the aggregate demand
function, equation (??), as
AD : xit = ￿￿(Rt ￿ Et￿i;t+1) + ￿(pjt ￿ pit) + ￿(st + p￿
t ￿ pit) + ￿xjt + zit + git + exi;t (13)
where gjt = ￿git. Equation (??) remains unchanged.
We may use the previous results to analyse this new problem as, in e⁄ect, the ￿scal transfer is
just another exogenous variable like zit. The di⁄erence is that gt = 0 and git ￿ gjt = 2git. Thus
the expected in￿ ation di⁄erential is
Et(￿i;t+1 ￿ ￿j;t+1) =
￿ + 2￿
￿
Et(pit ￿ pjt) +
1 + ￿
￿
(xni;t ￿ xnj;t) ￿
1
￿








Et(pit ￿ pjt) +
1 + ￿
2




The required ￿scal transfer from country i to country j is therefore larger, the greater is the price
and the natural output di⁄erential, and the smaller is the di⁄erential trade e⁄ect. Further, the
stronger the competitiveness and absorbtion e⁄ects, the larger the transfer.
Note that the transfer is from the high to the low in￿ ation country. This reduces economic
activity in the high in￿ ation country and raises it in the low in￿ ation country. In e⁄ect, therefore,
an in￿ ation tax is being imposed on the high in￿ ation country, and an in￿ ation subsidy is being
given to the low in￿ ation country.
164 Conclusions
We began by arguing - on somewhat intuitive grounds - that a consequence of a ￿once-size-
￿ts-all￿monetary policy in the euro-zone is that country in￿ ation di⁄erentials will persist and
even grow and that this would be accompanied by a divergence in economic activity with higher
in￿ ation countries growing faster than lower in￿ ation countries. We found that these predictions
are strongly supported by the data.
We then examined whether a loss of competitiveness of high in￿ ation countries and a gain in
competitiveness by low low in￿ ation countries, together with absorbtion by high activity countries
of low activity countries￿exports, could act to automatically stabilise the euro-zone. Based on
a model of the euro-zone derived from the standard New Keynesian model, and the assumption
of optimal discretionary monetary policy in the euro-zone, we found that automatic stabilisation
does not necessarily occur. Initial di⁄erences in country price levels, in natural rates of output
and world trade e⁄ects appear in theory to cause a permanent in￿ ation di⁄erential and diverging
price levels between member countries. Endogenising the capital stock, and hence the natural
level of output level, so that they respond to real interest rates only seems to make the in￿ ation
divergence worse.
The problem is not the fault of the ECB, which is powerless to do anything about it. It
is sometimes claimed that this problem is in the nature of monetary unions and is also present
within a single country. We have argued that it is usually ameliorated in a single country by ￿scal
transfers. We therefore examined whether ￿scal transfers between euro-zone countries could solve
the problem. We ￿nd that, in principle, they can. Suitably chosen, they could eliminate both
in￿ ation and price level di⁄erences between countries. In e⁄ect, an in￿ ation tax is required in
which high in￿ ation countries make transfers to low in￿ ation countries. In other words, Ireland
and Spain would be required to make ￿scal transfers to France and Germany. This seems to be
what usually happens within a single country. For example, the south east of England, a high
17in￿ ation and economic activity area, makes net transfers to the north of England, Scotland and
Wales. Within a single country regional ￿scal transfers are usually implicit and tied to economic
activity, in particular, to unemployment bene￿ts to the low economic activity regions.
In our theoretical model we assumed that the euro-zone countries were of the same size. In
practice, of course, there are considerable di⁄erences in size. Moreover, the high in￿ ation countries
seem in general to be smaller than the low in￿ ation countries. This would suggest that, to be
e⁄ective, the transfers from high in￿ ation/high economic activity countries might need to be large
relative to their GDP.
The political economy implications of this analysis of the euro-zone are potentially profound. If
monetary union is not sustainable unless buttressed by ￿scal policy, then the solution immediately
moves into the political arena. Fiscal transfers from high in￿ ation/high economic activity countries
to low in￿ ation/low economic activity countries are likely to require more political co-ordination
than at present. It may even presage a more politically integrated EU. Ultimately, therefore, the
choice may lie between closer political union and a break-up of the euro-zone.
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